

FAVELAS' RESIDENTS PERCEPTIONS ABOUT PUBLIC SECURITY AND POLICING IN RIO DE JANEIRO

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REALIZATION

LABORATÓRIO DE POBREZA, VIOLÊNCIA E
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OBSERVATÓRIO DE FAVELAS

REDES DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA MARÉ

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INTERVIEWERS:

Adriano Amorim	Laís Clemente de Oliveira
Alice Matos	Lauane da Silva Borges
Aline Ádria	Leonor Resenda
Allan Philipe	Leticia Moraes Ferreira
Allan Pinheiro da Silva	Licia Lima
Anny Barglini	Lucas Siqueira Lourenço
Ariana Vasconcelos	Lucio Mauro F. da Silva
Barbara da Silva Lucas	Maiara Cristine
Benson de Freitas Silva	Marcelle Dellamarque
Carla dos Santos Oliveira	Marcos Spagolla Napoleão Tavares
Carolina Araújo	Milena Manfredini
Cintia Trigueiro da Cruz	Monique Santiago
Cristiane Monteiro Leite	Patrícia Paula da Silva
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Deise da Mota Pimenta	Priscila Vicente Teixeira
Delane de Souza Santiago	Rafaela Seabra
Diogo Bezerra	Rayner Dias
Diva Santiago da Silva	Regina Celia Novaes
Elisabete Ferreira Gomes Coelho	Renata Bhering
Elza Maria Cristina Laurentino	Rodrigo Canara
Ian Ribeiro	Rogéria Batista do Nascimento
Isabel Valois	Rosilda B de Souza
Jaciele Gomes da Silva	Sheila Dos Santos Oliveira
Janaína Queiroz Ramos	Silvia Vieira Correa
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Jaqueline dos Santos	Suzan Stanley
Jayvane Quirino da Silva	Taina de Paula Alvarenga
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Jorge Batista Júnior	Victor Silva Franco
Juliete Laurentin	Viviane Linares

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Six years ago, the Poverty, Violence and Governance Lab (PoVgov) started conducting research in partnership with the Secretary of Public Security of Rio (SESEG) and the Military State Police of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ) aimed at understanding the individual, contextual, and institutional causes of the use of lethal force by police in Rio de Janeiro.

Unsurprisingly, police lethality has mainly affected the lives of thousands of favela residents in Rio de Janeiro, leading our team to identify and strengthen partnerships with favela residents and local organizations to deepen our understanding about the consequences of police violence in these territories. We partnered with two of the most prestigious and well-known civil society organizations in Brazil, Observatório de Favelas (Favelas' Observatory) and Redes da Maré (Network of Maré), to conduct a large-scale door-to-door survey on the public security perceptions of more than 6,000 favela residents. Our deepest gratitude to Jailson Silva, Director of Favelas' Observatory, and Eliana Sousa e Silva, Director of Redes da Maré, for partnering with us and embracing this research with such professionalism, competence, and passion. Your work commitment and life ideals are contagious. Thanks for guiding our team and overseeing the logistics of this work.

Many people on the ground helped produce this study. Thanks to Lidiane Malanquini e Gisele Ribeiro Martins for brilliantly coordinating the survey on the ground and for helping address many challenges and issues that arose during the survey collection. Also, we would like to thank the enumerators for their commitment and tireless hard work to collect the surveys. We know that without your courage and resilience this work would not have been possible. (Please find a list of our enumerators in the appendix). We thank Edinalva Sousa Silva for helping with the contracts, budget and administrative matters and Rodrigo Azevedo and his team for running initial results and creating a digital identity for this study.

Last but not least, a special thanks to Robert Nelson for helping us think and organize this report, and also for designing and thoughtfully describing the word cloud section. Thanks to Gustavo Empinotti for cleaning and organizing our database. Additionally, we thank Veriene Melo for contributing to the initial data analysis of this work and her remarkable insights on the topic. Veriene is also working to expand our qualitative analysis of 40 extensive interviews or case studies – which are, too, part of this research, but not included in this report. Once again, we thank everyone who took part in this important study. Thanks to all of you, it was possible to give voice to 6,000 favela residents on critical issues about public security, victimization and their relationship with the Military Police.

1. RESEARCH OVERVIEW

This study was conducted by the Poverty, Violence and Governance Lab (PovGov) in partnership with the Rio-based NGOs Favela's Observatory (Observatório de Favelas) and Redes de Maré, two of the most respected civil society organizations acting in Rio de Janeiro's favelas today. Our study seeks to understand the public security perceptions of residents living in four favelas that received a Pacifying Police Unit (UPP): Cidade de Deus, Providência, Rocinha and Batan.

We also interviewed residents of Complexo da Maré during the “pre-pacification” period when the Brazilian Armed Forces and the Military Police occupied Maré in preparation for the arrival of the UPP (Sousa Silva, 2017). In the end, Complexo da Maré did not receive a UPP and the occupation of the favela by the state's armed forces marked the end of the “pacification” process.

The goal of this study is to explore themes related to public security using a large-scale, door-to-door survey. The survey was administered between September 2015 and February 2016 and collected information from roughly 6,300 residents of Cidade de Deus, Providência, Rocinha, Batan and Maré.

Our aim is to generate a more informed debate about the security situation in Rio de Janeiro that gives voice to residents of the city's favelas. We seek to convey the experiences and perspectives of a large number of favela residents, including their patterns of interaction with the police and the armed criminal groups, their victimization experiences, changes in the security climate, evaluations of the UPP and the Military Police more broadly, and the overall public security situation in these communities.

2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONTEXT OF SECURITY IN RIO'S FAVELAS ¹

The state of Rio de Janeiro followed a strategy of repression and neglect toward the favelas. The state deprived the favelas of public services such as health, education, public infrastructure, and police forces. In the absence of the state, drug factions and militias took control of these territories and established parallel forms of social orders.

Three main criminal factions have constantly fought each other for control of the favelas: the Red Command (Comando Vermelho, CV), Friend of Friends (ADA), and Third Command (TC). In addition, vigilante groups or militias emerged across the city: well-organized armed men made up of former police officers, firemen, and prison guards. Militias promised to remove drug gangs and provide security to citizens, but in reality their ultimate goal, according to Ribeiro and Oliveira (2010), is economic profit. In some favelas (e.g., Complexo de Mare) the three criminal factions compete for control, and militias are also present, subjecting residents to constant threats of violence (Souza Silva, 2012).

As drug trafficking groups grew to become a real threat to the state and the city, the government responded declaring a “war on crime.” The Military Police engaged in periodic “invasions” of the slums, increasingly relying on special operation units such as the Battalion of Special Operations (BOPE), trained in urban warfare, as well as tactical teams operating within the regular territorial battalions. BOPE cops seldom get injured –or die– and their operations are known for violence and “efficiency”.

In the 1990s, a right-leaning governor instituted a very controversial policy known as the “bravery bonus”, which rewarded officers with salary bonuses for engaging in lethal shootouts with suspects (Cano, 1997). The law was revoked at the end of 1998, but the violent police culture persists. The militarized policing strategy resulted in the same outcome as the turf wars between criminal gangs: death and insecurity. In 2007 alone, official records acknowledged more than 1,300 fatal victims of police interventions in the State of Rio.

Police violence has targeted criminals as well as residents. The Military Police has justified killings by the police on the basis of legitimate defense or “resistance to arrest” (Auto de Resistência). Police commanders seldom conduct internal investigations when police kill and the criminal justice practically never investigates these killings. The reality is that killings by the police are vindicated by the state and the larger society, which has trivialized violence, especially when this affects black people in the favelas. A common phrase in Brazil, “Bandido bom é bandido morto” (A good criminal is a dead criminal) is a reflection of the existing racial stereotypes.

¹ THIS SECTION IS TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM MAGALONI, BEATRIZ, EDGAR FRANCO AND VANESSA MELO (2017) “KILLING IN THE SLUMS: THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL ORDER AND POLICING IN RIO DE JANEIRO”.

Moreover, various massacres by the police have taken place in the favelas, killing innocent children, women, and men. One of the most infamous was the massacre in the Church of Candelaria, where a police death squad exterminated six children and six adolescents. A month later another massacre took place in Vigarão Geral following the murder of a police officer. Around 50 police officers came to the favela and murdered a total of 21 unarmed people (Glenny, 2015). In 2013 nine residents were killed in Complexo de Maré in an act of revenge for the death of a BOPE officer. Sousa Silva (2017) explains that demonstrations by local organizations prompted the Civil Police to investigate for the first time. After three years, the conclusion was that eight residents were killed while allegedly resisting the police and one was murdered in cold blood, but no police was charged with this murder.

In 2008, the government of Rio de Janeiro implemented a far-reaching police reform with the introduction of the UPPs, inspired by notions of community-oriented policing and composed of mostly young police officers recently graduated from the Police Academy. The “pacification” entailed a pre-announced “invasion” by BOPE, and in some cases the armed forces were also involved. In contrast to invasions in the past, this time the community was previously alerted in order to avoid armed resistance from the first moment. In fact, what happened in many “pacifications” is that some criminals were arrested but many others escaped the intervened favelas, to take refuge elsewhere or later come back. After an initial stage of stabilization, the favela was then handed over to the UPP.

The first UPP was introduced in 2008 and these units gradually expanded to more than 100 favelas. More than 9,000 police officers were assigned to the UPPs, with around 11 cops per 1,000 inhabitants. In total, there are 763 favelas in Rio de Janeiro, more than 140 received a UPP.

Magaloni et al (2017) uncover three motivations behind the location of the UPPs. The first is an economic motivation. Favelas near tourist destinations in the South Zone and the Maracanã stadium were a priority. A major incentive for the government to implement the UPP was the fact that Brazil had won the bid to hold the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic games, which would take place in Rio. Another incentive to intervene favelas in the South Zone was that these are located in some of the hills near upper class neighborhoods such as Ipanema, Leblon and Copacabana, whose demands for security are a major concern for the government.

The second motive for UPP selection was tactical Territories controlled by the Comando Vermelho (CV) were disproportionately targeted. CV is the most belligerent drug trafficking faction, which on various occasions engaged in large-scale terrorist activities targeting buildings of the Military Police as well as burning buses. CV also has engaged in kidnappings and bank robberies (Arias, 2006; Barbosa, 2015; Glenny, 2015). In contrast, ADA favelas were selected less often because this criminal faction favored accommodation with the police and corruption over confrontation.

Finally, favelas controlled by the militias were seldom selected for pacification. Batan, a poor favela located in the Northwest, is the only exception. As Glenny (2015) explains “the freelance activities [of the militias] enjoy the tacit support of their commanders, as well as a large part of the middle class frightened by what they regarded as the menace of the favelas” (p. 83).

In terms of the timing of the interventions, the first stage of pacification was less challenging because it included many of the smaller favelas in the South Zone. In November 2010 the pacification process began a new stage when the headquarter of the CV faction, Complexo do Alemão, was occupied by a force of 1,200 military police, 400 civilian police, 300 federal police and 800 members of the Brazilian army. The Brazilian army occupied Complexo for around 14 months until the corresponding four UPPs were introduced in mid-2012. The UPP intervention in Complexo do Alemão was not part of the original plan, taking place in response to a terrorist attack by CV in mid-November 2010.

The largest favela of Rio, Rocinha, together with São Gonçalo, the heart of the ADA faction, was occupied in 2012. The pacification of Rocinha might not have taken place when it did had it not been for the events at the Intercontinental Hotel in August 2010, when a group of traffickers from Rocinha held tourists hostage for hours, until they were instructed by the drug lord of Rocinha, to give themselves up peacefully (Glenny, p. 230-239). The proximity of the World Cup and the Olympics made it difficult for the government to justify not targeting Rocinha for pacification.

Control of Alemão and Rocinha remains strongly contested. After these interventions took place, violent confrontations between police and traffickers became more frequent, significantly increasing the rate at which UPP police are killed. Police officers with better training – including BOPE cops– started to be assigned to some of the more difficult UPPs.

The summer of 2013 marked the beginning of the current period of decay of the “pacification” process due to the Amarildo scandal. For over two months, a resident of Rocinha, Amarildo de Souza, was classified by the authorities as “missing.” As the case began to gain public attention, further details revealed that Amarildo had been seized and taken to police barracks where he was interrogated, but officers proceeded to beat and torture him with electric shocks and plastic bags over his head.

Attempting to salvage the legitimacy of the UPP, the Military Police detained 10 officers and the State Prosecutor’s Office reported the involvement of an additional 15 military policemen in the torture and death of Amarildo. The commander of the UPP of Rocinha, a BOPE trained police officer, was put in custody.

Fatal police shootings have further contributed to undermine the legitimacy of the UPP among favela residents. One of the most disturbing moments in the Alemão intervention was the death of a 10 year old, Eduardo de Jesus. But many other bystanders, including women and children, have been shot dead or injured in the “pacified” favelas. Video recording showing evidence of police violence have gone viral on social media adding visibility to fatal police shootings. A paradigmatic case occurred in the favela of Providência, where five police officers were caught in a graphic video altering the crime scene and placing a gun in the hand the dead body of a young man they killed unarmed.

The occupation of Complexo da Maré by the armed forces marks the end of the “pacification” process. The Brazilian Army occupied Maré – one of the most violent and disputed areas of Rio de Janeiro – from April of 2014 to June of 2015 (Sousa Silva, 2017). The aim was to establish secure conditions for the implementation of the UPP, but that never took place. Interviews with the General Commander of the UPP at the time of the Maré intervention revealed that the Military Police had concluded that the UPPs were a failed project.

One of the negative consequences of the militarized approach to policing the favelas is that it worked to undermine the legitimacy of the police among residents and even bolstered community support for the drug traffickers. Far removed from the communities, the police have traditionally distrusted residents and often treated them as though they were “enemies of the state” associated with the traffickers.

Police abuses have ranged from unwarranted searches, beatings, torture (asphyxiating and drowning victims in an effort to obtain information about traffickers), and summary executions (Report of the UN Special Rapporteur for Summary Executions, 2009; Amnesty International Report, 2015).

Aggressive policing strategies have been shown to erode the legitimacy of the police and cooperation with law enforcement (Tyler, 2001; Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2003: p. 286; Kirsk et al, 2012). It is not surprising that favela residents often consider the police as an instrument of repression rather than an institution to protect their rights (Sousa Silva, 2017).

Building trust in the police is difficult where there is a long history of oppression. Rio’s violent police culture has its roots in colonialism and slavery, as well as a more recent source engendered by the war on drugs, which shifted the overarching goal of the Military Police to literally exterminating drug traffickers.

The UPPs were an attempt to change the traditional repressive approach of law enforcement. The Military Police purposely sought to recruit young police officers with no prior experience in the regular territorial battalions so that they would not replicate old practices.²⁰ The goal of the program was to institute a community-friendly police. UPPs officers allegedly received a different training than the rest of the police based on notions of problem-oriented policing, although our qualitative research revealed that they receive very limited additional training.

However, the mission of the program got increasingly compromised as instances of police misbehavior started to accumulate. Probably the most damaging case involved the torture scandal in the Amarildo case, which was a major setback for the government efforts to construct an image of the UPP as a resident-friendly police force. Rather, the scandal appears to have contributed to spreading distrust of UPPs everywhere.

But many other instances of police misconduct also worked to undermine the legitimacy of the project. Our informants reported numerous problems with UPP, ranging from disrespect, systematic and aggressive low-level arrests and police stops, torture, extortion, and fatal shootings that killed innocent children and women. The critical consequence is that the community will not confer authority to the state's security apparatus if they perceive police officers are abusive or if they see them as crooks.

In the following pages, we will present one of the most extensive analysis to data of public security perceptions among favela residents. The following section explains our case selection and the methodology. We then explore the rich set of questions and responses about public security, victimization, trust/distrust to the police, relationship with criminal groups, police abuse and corruption, among others.

3. METHODS AND STUDY LIMITATIONS

A group of experienced researchers from Rio-based civil society organizations Observatório de Favelas applied a survey instrument to 6,199 favelas' residents at the participants' households from December 2015 to March 2016. The questionnaire completion time was approximately 45 minutes on average and interviewers used a tablet to collect respondent's answers. A representative size sample was defined by favelas' demographic characteristics, such as population size and domiciles. Table 1 shows the final sample and margin of error by each favela.

Table 1. Survey sample

TERRITORY	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS	MARGIN OF ERROR
MARÉ	1.202	+/-2,81PP
ROCINHA	1.494	+/-2,50PP
CIDADE DE DEUS	1.201	+/-2,78PP
BATAN	1.203	+/-2,73PP
PROVIDÊNCIA	1.2	+/-2,30PP
TOTAL	6.004	-

Regarding the methodology for application of the questionnaires, Favela's Observatory team used the IBGE census sectors as a reference to divide the locations to be surveyed. Each enumerator had a number of census tracts (which varies by favela) for interviews. The addresses were drawn by census sectors and the enumerators strictly visited residences previously listed, not being able to apply the questionnaires at addresses different from those received.

Around 10-15 interviewers were hired in each favela to carry out the data collection. Besides the selection of the census sector, the fieldwork team was instructed to carefully balance skin color, age, and gender to the sample distribution.

During the enumerator recruiting process, initially a group of residents agreed to participate in the survey, but then gave up on participating when they received more information on the subject. This universe contains a total of 376 approaches that are not included in the total of the questionnaires collected.

From 6,199 questionnaires applied, less than 1% of the questionnaires (58 questionnaires) were considered incomplete and invalid for lacking enough answers (80% incomplete). According to the interviewers' statements, in both cases (abandonment and incompleteness) the main causes to participants' desistance was: a) the size of the questionnaire, b) the difficulty in understanding the issues for a particular group of people and, especially, c) the fear of answering questions about UPP and drug trafficking activities. The worries and fears presented by hundreds of slum dwellers surveyed are not trivial. In fact, public safety, even in favelas with the presence of UPPs, provokes great resistance – not only among residents but also among enumerators.

Between October and November 2015, Favela's Observatory and Redes da Maré began the process of selection and training of Maré's fieldwork team. The application of questionnaires in this territory started in November 2015. In the remaining regions selection, training, and the survey application took place in December 2015. An ideal profile was developed to help find researchers capable of carrying out the complex work due to the territory's features and a vast set of questions towards complex topics, such as police violence and criminal activities in the community. The ideal interviewer profile was established as follows: [1] young and adults, between 18 and 35 years; [2] residents of the areas to be surveyed or who work in these localities; [3] have experience in field research and/or work in favelas.

A group of local supervisors was available to support the fieldwork teams. The main goal of the weekly supervision was to follow up on data collection, resolve doubts and support the researchers "in loco." Interviewers reported several problems during data collection. Among them, the most common were: a) resistance to the topic Public Safety / Police by the residents; b) difficulty in keeping the interviewee's attention until the end of the questionnaire due to the size and time of application of the instrument; c) difficulty in finding addresses, and, d) armed conflicts in communities (especially Maré and Providência).

Apart from closed questions and scales, the questionnaire included a few survey experiments, i.e. different versions of the questionnaire were presented to the respondents so as to test the impact of specific wording and/or specific information on the answers. In fact, there were two versions of the questionnaire, each with different formulation for 4 separate questions. Even-numbered questionnaires corresponded to version 'a' and odd numbered to version 'b'. Apparently, no interviewee detected that there was more than one version.

a) Local scenario and challenges to conduct study by favela

This section aims to provide brief information on fieldwork and data collection particularity in each territory. In total, there were 5,300 questionnaires collected in the favelas of Providência, Batan, Cidade de Deus, Rocinha and Complexo da Maré. These areas were selected because they vary in size, territorial control and contestation. In particular, Batan was controlled by a militia, Rocinha by Amigos dos Amigos (ADA), Providência and Cidade de Deus by CV. Maré has the presence of all three criminal factions and the militias, making its territories some of the most contested in the city of Rio.

The favelas selected to participate in this study experienced a variety of local events before and during the study length, such as constant shootouts and killings by the police that might have influenced residents' perceptions about the UPP and public security. Below we provide a brief description of the environment and challenges to collect data in each favela when the study took place.

. Cidade de Deus

Cidade de Deus was one of the most difficult territories to administer the questionnaires. Besides the territorial dimension of Cidade de Deus, one of the largest territories studied, between December 2015 and early January 2016, this territory experienced daily armed conflicts between criminal groups.

According to the enumerators' reports, episodes such as constant shootings directly affected fieldwork, making it difficult to approach residents and receive participation acceptance in the research. Due to the complexity of the territory, the enumerators were relocated near the main roads of Cidade de Deus to prioritize their safety and guarantee study continuity. In these areas, interviewers perceived greater openness to participation in the research - as reported by the researchers the previous week. During this period, nine researchers gave up participating in the research, due to the great instability of the territory.

. Providência

Although Providência is considered a small favela among the ones selected for this study, the geography inside the favela, such as taller hills imposed some difficulty in the transit of researchers between different locations inside Providência. The favela's location, near the Center of Rio de Janeiro, facilitates the selection and access of interviewers residing outside of this territory. During the first week of the study, the team experienced some armed conflicts in that locality, which led to the resignation of some researchers (4). However, the questionnaires were collected without major delays.

In September 2015 – three months before this study – three police officers from the UPP Providência killed a young man and were caught forging the evidence to change the crime scene.

. Rocinha

Rocinha is the largest favela of Rio de Janeiro and known for its complex territorial geography. During the data collection, interviewers complained about fatigue, as they had to climb up and down the alleys to contact respondents previously selected on the list. Another fieldwork issue was the difficulty of finding addresses, since the ones listed on the National Address Book (data source for the research), were not the same as those that the residents knew and used in their daily lives. This fact required a great effort by the interviewers and local articulators. In Rocinha, local residents were hired to conduct the survey, since access to that locality was distant from other parts of the city - from downtown to Rocinha by bus it takes an average of 1 hour and 10 minutes.

Regarding data collection and perceptions, the patterns of armed criminal groups' presence and the greater or lesser police occupation interfered directly both in the presence of the interviewer in that locality and in the perception of the resident. Another issue that seemed to us recurring in the field research would be the idea of a "crisis" in the UPP of Rocinha after the "Amarildo death" that generated a great repercussion in the social media and, in the mainstream media, which led to the arrest of several local UPP officers.

. Batan

The favela Batan was one of the easiest communities to map and survey. Favela's Observatory partnered with some local institutions to select the researchers. In general, the researchers of the Batan were local residents, which facilitates access to the field, approach to the residents and permanence in the field. Added to this, a low dropout of researchers (only 4) facilitated the process of training and strengthening the team.

. Maré

The Maré Complex of favelas was the first territory chosen to test the methodology and began fieldwork (November of 2015). Some factors may explain lesser challenges in the study in Maré compared to the other areas: a) greater permanence/stability of the team (only 3 withdrawals, throughout the research); b) the expertise of the Redes and Favelas Observatory with data collection in that territory; c) the recognition and trustworthiness of these institutions among the inhabitants of that territory; and, d) the existence of a former local team, which was familiar with the territory and had the skills required to conduct fieldwork in favelas.

4. DEMOGRAPHICS

In this section, we will introduce a brief summary of residents' characteristics that participated in the research. Table 2 below shows the distribution of residents interviewed by favela.


Table 2: Residents interviewed by favela

FAVELA	%
BATAN	16%
CIDADE DE DEUS	19%
MARÉ	20%
PROVIDÊNCIA	16%
ROCINHA	28%
TOTAL	100%

From all the residents interviewed, 51% were women and 49% were men. Regarding race or ethnicity, approximately 39% defined themselves as brown, 30% as white, 29% as black, and a small number of cases as other categories. According to the IBGE Population Census of 2010, the racial makeup of the state of Rio de Janeiro is 47% white, 39% brown and 12% black. Hence, the racial composition of our survey is significantly "darker" than the general population, with only 30% of residents that define themselves as white.

Regarding the age, the research aimed to select residents of varied ages to understand experiences and conflicts that could be directly related to age. 40% of the residents interviewed are between 14 and 35 years old. Historically, this category range is the most affected by police and criminal violence.


Figure 1: Age groups



Most residents declared themselves as Catholics (45%) or Evangelicals (41%), with only 14% declaring that they belong to other religions. Another 24% declared themselves "without religion". The percentage of people without a religion is higher than that observed in the general population (16%).

Regarding the level of schooling of the interviewees, about 29% have completed elementary school and 26% have completed secondary school. Only about 3% of respondents had access to a university. The number of residents interviewed who attended a postgraduate or masters course is statistically insignificant for the sample collected.

Figure 2: Education levels




A large proportion of the respondents are married (37%); however, the highest percentage among the interviewees is widowers (44%). About 76% say they have children.

The vast majority of respondents have been living in their respective favelas for a long period of time. 64% of the interviewees reported that they have lived in their communities for more than 20 years, followed by 14% who has 15 to 20 years of residence.

The figure below shows that the majority of residents interviewed are unemployed (49%), followed by 39% who declared that they have a formal job with a contract (carteira assinada). However, 6% declared to perform formal job tasks, such as fixed work hours and monthly salary even though they lack a formal contract (sem carteira assinada). To simplify this analysis, the responses “I do bicos” and “work with family/non-paid work” listed in the survey were combined and classified as unemployed. Around 9% of the participants have their own business or are autonomous (self-employed).

Figure 3: Employment



The monthly income for favela’s residents is low considering the cost of living in a city such as Rio de Janeiro. As showed in figure 4 around 10% of the respondents live with one to two minimum wages, which correspond to approximately \$293-586 dollars monthly.

We begin by describing the set of complex feelings the police inspires in the favela residents. The word cloud above summarizes how residents feel about the police when asked: “in your opinion, which feeling the majority of the community has demonstrated in relation to the police that work” in their favela.

Respondents were given a menu of options equally split between positive and negative words: fear, respect, distrust, admiration, sympathy, indifference, disrespect, indifference, rage, or “other” where they could express any feeling they desire if they did not agree with any of the options provided.

The word cloud above summarizes the results, suggesting that when residents relate their feelings toward the police, they mostly used harsh language. The word cloud above displays every word used by favela residents to describe the police and adjusts the size of each word depending on the number of times it was mentioned.

Several observations jump out. First, the largest, and therefore most frequently used words, are critical. People “fear” and “distrust” the police. Second, those who provided their own description of the police describe a deeply contentious state of affairs. Unprompted, people chose to describe the police as “revolting,” “abusive,” “terrorizing,” and deserving of “hate.” Lastly, while positive words were mentioned, they were used comparatively infrequently. For example, “respect” was the third most chosen word, but it was closely followed in the rankings not by other positive assessments of the police, but by “indifferent,” “disrespect,” and “rage.”

In short, when favela residents are given the opportunity to relay their feelings toward the police, they reply with accusatory language that speaks to a relationship that has rotten away to almost nothing. The UPP was therefore created to address a problem that truly did exist: the deep seated community distrust and fear toward the police.

The rest of this report will explore to what extent the UPP was successful in improving the police-community relationship, and reveal where the UPP was effective as well as where they failed to improve on the status quo. The report also will uncover important variation of feelings toward the police depending on sociodemographic categories such as skin color, age, income and education levels. We will also understand who is more at risk of being victimized by the police and by criminal groups, and how these victimizations experiences shape opinions toward the UPP and the Military Police more broadly.

6. EVALUATIONS OF THE UPP

This section discusses how favela residents evaluate the UPPs. The section focuses on the favelas that received the UPP, excluding perceptions from Maré’s residents because here the UPP was never established.

Table 3 displays information on various questions related to the UPP. These questions reveal that residents have mixed evaluations of the UPP: only 31% think that the UPP was positive for their community, 23% think that the UPP improved the relationship between the community and the police, and 28% that their life and their family’s improved as a result of the UPP.

By contrast, 22% answered that the UPP was negative, 27% that it did not improve the relationship between the police and the community, and 10% that their life and their family’s did not improve.

It is important to highlight that the largest number of respondents do not have either positive nor negative evaluations, but somewhere in between, answering to these questions “in part” or that “things stayed the same” with the UPP. Another important aspect to underscore is that despite these mixed evaluations, 46% expressed a preference for the UPP to stay and only 15% told us that they desire the UPP to leave, with the remaining 38% responding that they “do not know.”


Table 3: Evaluations of the UPP

	SIM	NÃO	EM PARTE
DO YOU THINK THE UPP WAS POSITIVE?	31%	22%	35%*
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE RELATIONSHIP WITH FAVELA RESIDENTS AND THE POLICE IMPROVED WITH THE UPP?	23%	27%	50%
DID YOUR LIFE AND YOU FAMILY’S IMPROVED?	28%	10%	62%
DO YOU WANT THE UPP TO LEAVE YOUR FAVELA?	15%	46%	38%

*EXCLUDES 11% WHO ANSWERED DO NOT KNOW.


Residents have markedly different evaluations of the UPP depending on the favelas they were assigned to. Figure 5 lays out the evaluations of the UPP in the different favelas. In Batan, 60% of the population believes that the UPP was a positive development for the favela’s residents, with only 4% disagreeing. In Rocinha, in contrast, 40% of the population disagrees with the statement that the “UPP was positive for residents” with only half of that amount (20) agreeing. Providência and the CDD are in the middle, with 20% and 30%, respectively, believing that the UPP was a force for good.

Figure 5. Evaluations of the UPP



However, while the assessments of the UPP are far from uniformly positive, respondents across the board are hesitant to say the UPP should leave. As Figure 6 shows, large majorities or pluralities in three of the favelas studied, Batan (74%), CDD (56%), and Providência (37%), do not believe the UPP should abandon their community. Only Rocinha leans towards wanting to see the UPP leave, and they are split on the subject: with 30% wanting to see the UPP go, 27% wanting it to stay, and 43% uncertain.

Figure 6. UPP should leave the favela



NOTE: EXCLUDES "DO NOT KNOW" ANSWERS.

4.1. SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES OF UPP EVALUATIONS

a) An Index of residents' evaluations of the UPP


This section explores how residents' evaluations of the "pacification" relate with issues such as age, skin color, income and education levels. To explore these correlations in a more systematic way, we require statistical analysis that allow measuring how different variables correlate with opinions about the UPP.

To analyze evaluations of the UPP, we construct an *index of support* for the "pacification" using answers to the questions presented in table 3. We use the "internal consistency method" based on the Cronbach's alpha to estimate the reliability the estimated index. This method evaluates the degree to which the set of items used to form a scale or index measure the same theoretical dimension. The Cronbach alpha coefficient is a measure of the correlation of the items that form an index or scale.

In this case, the variables used to construct the UPP support index show an alpha coefficient of 0.81. Because this value is above 0.70 (the acceptable minimum), we can conclude that our measure has internal consistency, therefore, it is a good measure to evaluate how the residents of the favelas evaluate the UPP.

The following histogram presents the *index of support* to the UPP that bundles together in a single dimension the questions presented in table 3. The index goes from -1 (least favorable opinions) to 3 (most favorable). The average score for the total sample of favela residents is 0.64 and its standard deviation is .57. The average index in Batan is 1.07, Providência is 0.76, CDD is 0.72, and Rocinha is 0.39. Batan residents are significantly more favorable to the UPP, according to this index. Opinions among Providência and CDD residents are clustered around the mean, whereas opinions in Rocinha are significantly more negative.

Figure 7: Index of Support to UPP



We use the *index of support* to explore in a systematic manner how residents of the favelas divide in terms of their evaluations of the UPP. We employ a simple Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) that allows studying relationships between a continuous variable - such as the index of support for the UPP -- and a series of explanatory variables. In this case, we include a series of sociodemographic variables and an indicator for favela of residency.

Regression results are displayed in figure 8, which present the predicted values for the explanatory variables and their confidence intervals. The figure draws a vertical red line at the mean value of the index of support (0.69). The green lines crossing the red dots are the confidence intervals. For two variables to be statistically different from each other, these green lines need not overlap.

We summarize the results of the factors that correlate with support to the “pacification” as follows:

- . Women are significantly more likely to approve of the UPP than men.
- . Married couples are the least supportive of the UPP relative to singles, widows, and divorced couples.
- . Those who have children are less supportive of the UPP than those with no children.
- . Age has a very strong impact on evaluations of the UPP, with those between 14 to 25 and 26 to 35 years old consistently having the *least favorable* evaluations of the UPP.
- . Blacks are significantly less favorable towards the UPP than whites, although the coefficient barely reaches statistical significance.
- . Pardos are also less likely to support the UPP than whites, although the coefficient does not reach statistical significance.
- . Evangelicals and Catholics have more positive evaluations of the UPP than people with no religion.
- . Those adhering to Umbanda or Candomblé have more negative evaluations about the UPP than those with other or no religion.
- . Education does not have a statistically significant impact.
- . Income has a positive and statistically significant effect on support for the UPP: those who earn less than one minimum wage are less supportive of the UPP than those who earn more.
- . Those who have a friend or relative who is a police officer favor the UPP more than those who don't.
- . Residents in Batan have the most favorable opinions of the UPP. The most negative evaluations of the UPP are among Rocinha's residents. Opinions in CDD and Providência can't be distinguished from each other but these are clearly more negative than in Batan and more positive than in Rocinha.

Figure 8: OLS results: predicted values of the index of support for the UPP



b) Should the UPP leave your community?

The analysis above reveals how opinions about the UPP differ among residents in the favelas. We have established that residents have mixed evaluations about the UPP but that a larger number does not desire the UPP to leave their favela, probably because they know that, without a permanent police presence, the security situation could deteriorate.

To understand how favela residents differ in terms of whether the UPP should stay or leave, we perform a statistical model using the question “Do you wish for the UPP to leave the favela?? Modeling answers to this question has some challenges because of the large number of “don’t know” answers (38%).

One possibility is to consider that these responses can be ordered in between yes and no answers. If this assumption is valid, we can perform an ordered probit, a statistical model that is appropriate for categorical variables that can be ordered. In the appendix, we present the results of this model.

One of the difficulties of this type of statistical model is that it is harder to present the results in a succinct manner that is simple to understand. To be able to better interpret the results, we perform a logit model with a dichotomous measure of our dependent variable. We recoded the answers as follows: those who answered “no” are coded as 1 and “yes” and “do not know” as 0. The logit model seeks to explain how much residents want the UPP to stay relative to wanting it to leave or not having an opinion². As explanatory variables, we include the sociodemographic categories and dummy variables for favelas.


We present in figure 9 predicted probabilities of desiring the UPP to stay in the favela for each socio-demographic group. The average predicted probability of wanting the UPP to stay is 0.49. These results allow concluding that the strongest factor predicting whether a resident wants the UPP to stay or leave is favela residency. Residents of Rocinha are predicted to have a 0.27 chance of wanting the UPP to stay, relative to those of Batan at a 0.74, CDD at 0.55 and Providência at 0.38.

The second most relevant factor explaining whether a resident wants the UPP to stay or leave is religion. Those with no religion and who adhere to Candomblé or Umbanda have a predicted probability of wanting the UPP to stay of 0.27. The corresponding predicted probability for Catholics is (0.47) and for Evangelicals is significantly higher, 0.55.

The third most relevant factor predicting if a resident wants the UPP to stay or not is schooling, with those with no formal education having a much lower predicted probability of wanting the UPP to stay (0.39) relative to those with Ensino Medio (0.49) or Superior (0.55).

² WE ALSO PERFORM AN ANALYSIS OF RESIDENTS' DESIRE FOR THE UPP TO LEAVE THE FAVELA, BUT EXCLUDING THE “DO NOT KNOW” ANSWERS. THE RESULTS ARE VERY SIMILAR TO THE ONES PRESENTED IN FIGURE X ABOVE. HENCE, IN ALL OF THE ANALYSES BELOW ABOUT WHETHER THE UPP SHOULD LEAVE OR NOT, WE WILL USE A DICHOTOMOUS SPECIFICATION OF THIS VARIABLE (0,1), WHERE WE DO NOT DROP THE LARGE NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWER “DON'T KNOW” TO THIS QUESTION.

Figure 9 Logit model: predicted probabilities that the UPP should stay in the favela



NOTE: THESE PREDICTED PROBABILITIES ARE DERIVED FROM A LOGIT MODEL WHERE THOSE WHO WANT THE UPP TO LEAVE THE FAVELA ARE CODED AS 1 AND THOSE WHO DON'T WANT THE UPP TO LEAVE AS 0 OR DO NOT HAVE AN OPINION AS 0.

7. TERRITORIAL CONTROL OF THE FAVELAS

The UPP was meant to weaken the territorial control by armed criminal groups and their dominance of the favelas. One of the main goals of the project was to gain back these territories from criminal groups by providing a permanent police presence that would monopolize the use of violence in the favelas and be able to bring security to its residents.

On the other hand, many inside the favelas were optimistic about the possibility that the “pacification” would bring an increase in economic investments and social development projects. By shifting territorial control from the criminal groups to the state and guaranteeing security, investment and development projects of the favelas could increase. In the beginning, the UPP was accompanied by some development projects, within the program called “UPP social” that bundled a range of projects meant to improve urban development. Nonetheless, the “UPP social” was terminated after a couple of years of work.

On top of these major goals, the UPPs were seen by many, both inside and outside the police, as a chance to change the relationship between the Military Police and residents of the favelas. The UPP were supposed to change policing strategy, from an extremely militaristic approach based on periodic military “invasions” of the slums to a form of community-oriented police.

The survey asked various questions that assess how the UPP performed on some of these critical dimensions. The questions and answers are presented in table 4.

The survey reveals that residents have mixed evaluations about UPP performance on these dimensions. Only 14% answered that the UPP managed to regain territorial control from criminal groups relative to 37% that answered that the UPP failed on this dimension. 20% of people reported that the UPP ended the use of arms while the same percentage told us that the UPP had no impact on arms use. 30% said that the UPP did not end armed confrontations between criminal groups and the police, while 23% answered that it did.

Hence, when looking at the UPP’s capacity to regain territorial control and end armed confrontations, negative evaluations are significantly more numerous than positive ones. The reality is that most of the “pacified” favelas remain areas of imperfect territorial control, where armed criminal groups continue to be present and continuously fight with the police leading to intense armed confrontations and shootouts that put the lives of residents at risk.

Table 4: Evaluations of UPP's performance

DO YOU BELIEVE THE UPP INSTALATION	YES	IN BETWEEN	NO	DON'T KNOW
ENDED THE CONTROL OF CRIMINAL GROUPS	14	37	37	12
CEASED THE OSTENSIBLE USE OF GUNS BY CRIMINALS	20	35	32	13
DECREASED ARMED CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND CRIMINALS GROUPS	23	35	30	12

DO YOU BELIEVE THE UPP INSTALATION	DECREASE	THE SAME	INCREASED
ROBBERY CRIMES	32	49	19
POLICE CORRUPTION	22	56	21
PARTICIPATION IN SECURITY DECISIONS	14	67	18
THE STIGMA OF LIVING IN A FAVELA	33	57	10
INCREASED LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	10	41	48

In terms of crime, only 32% believed that the UPP decreased crime, 49% answered that it stayed the same and 19% said that crime increased. This is a worrisome result. The state of Rio de Janeiro invested a massive amount of resources: sending more than 9,000 police officers to over 100 favelas with more than 1,000 people (Magaloni et al, 2017). The fact that such a large police presence had a very limited effect on controlling common crime, and that in some favelas crimes such as robbery, theft, rape, and assault even increased, reflects a serious limitation of the reform.

In some favelas the criminal groups were even more effective than the police at controlling crimes such as theft, assault and rape. The paradox is that some residents felt relatively “safer” inside the favelas even when the state never provided security in these areas. In some favelas, criminal groups provided a form of “security” to residents by punishing thieves, rapists, and other common criminals sometimes with death (Sousa e Silva, 2015,2017).

In terms of police corruption, residents are equally divided between those who say the UPP increased (21%) and decreased (22%) police corruption. The type of police corruption that residents experience ranges from asking residents to pay bribes for all sorts of reasons, including holding parties, having a band play, paying to “regularize” moto-taxis, or not to arrest a family member. In some areas the UPP behaved as the militia, charging residents for access to services such as cable TV, electricity, and gas. Another form of police corruption relates to arrangements between the police and the drug traffickers where officers receive money to let drugs flow freely.

It is worth emphasizing that a sizable number of residents (48%) answered that the UPP brought increases in local economic development, and 33% reported that the UPP decreased discrimination.

Table 5 presents responses to these questions by favela. In terms of territorial control, Batan residents offer remarkably better assessments, 34% reporting that the UPP ended territorial control by criminal groups. Only 4% of residents of Cidade de Deus, by contrast, report that the UPP ended territorial control by criminal groups. The corresponding figures for Providência and Rocinha are 13% and 9%. Hence, on the critical question of whether the state managed to gain back territorial control from armed criminal groups, the UPP performs very poorly in all of these favelas, with the exception of Batan.

In terms of armed confrontations between criminal groups and the police, residents of Cidade de Deus report the most serious concerns, with close to 50% reporting that armed confrontations did not decrease with the UPP. The corresponding figures are 16% for Providência, 42% for Rocinha and 3% for Batan who answered that armed confrontations between the police and the criminal groups did not decrease with the UPP.

It is clear that in Batan the UPP was successful reclaiming territorial control from criminal groups and reducing armed confrontations between these and the police. These factors account for the fact that Batan residents have such positive assessments of the UPP.

By contrast, in the rest of the favelas, and particularly in Cidade de Deus and Rocinha, territorial control remains extremely contested between the police and heavily armed criminal groups.

In terms of crimes such as assault, theft, rape, and domestic violence, most residents agree that the UPP made no difference. Only in Batan 56% report that these crimes markedly decreased. More worrisome are that in some favelas, and in particular in Rocinha, a sizable number (35%) report that crimes increased with the arrival of the UPP and 48% report that the UPP made no difference.

Police corruption is another serious concern among favela residents. With the exception of Batan, residents mostly report that police corruption remained the same after the arrival of the UPP, although in Rocinha a sizable number (35%) report an increase in police corruption.

Answers to the last questions about changes in stigma and increases in socio-economic development are also more positive among Batan residents, who report a significant increase in socio-economic development projects and a reduction of discrimination toward favela residents as a result of the instalment of the UPP.

Overall, with these responses we can make sense of why Batan residents have significantly more favorable opinions of the UPP. In Batan, according to our respondents, the UPP was better able to regain territorial control, decrease armed confrontations between the police and criminal groups and end the ostensive use of weapons. Batan residents also report that the UPP was able to reduce crime and police corruption. Moreover, with the arrival of the UPP, Batan experienced an increase in economic investments and socio-economic development projects and a reduction of discrimination, according to the respondents.

The worst performance in these dimensions is observed in Rocinha followed by Cidade de Deus. In these favelas, the UPP did not end territorial control by criminal groups, the ostensive use of weapons, or armed confrontations between criminals and the police.

Table 5.1.: Performance evaluation of the UPP by favela

QUESTIONS	RESPONSE	RESPONSE BY FAVELA (%)			
		BATAN	CDD	PROVIDÊNCIA	ROCINHA
DO YOU BELIEVE THE UPP INSTALATION ENDED THE CONTROL OF CRIMINAL GROUPS?	DON'T KNOW	11%	6%	25%	10%
	IN PART	45%	33%	40%	32%
	NO	11%	56%	22%	49%
	YES	34%	4%	13%	9%
DO YOU BELIEVE THE UPP INSTALATION CEASED THE OSTENSIBLE USE OF GUNS BY CRIMINALS?	DON'T KNOW	10%	6%	26%	11%
	IN PART	29%	37%	41%	34%
	NO	5%	50%	20%	43%
	YES	56%	7%	14%	12%
DO YOU BELIEVE THE UPP INSTALATION DECREASED ARMED CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND CRIMINALS GROUPS ?	DON'T KNOW	9%	6%	25%	10%
	IN PART	31%	34%	43%	34%
	NO	3%	49%	16%	42%
	YES	57%	11%	16%	13%


Table 5.2.: Performance evaluation of the UPP by favela

DO YOU BELIEVE THE UPP INSTALATION...	RESPONSE	RESPONSE BY FAVELA (%)			
		BATAN	CDD	PROVIDÊNCIA	ROCINHA
THE NUMBER OF CRIMES AS ROBBERY, HOUSE ROBBERY, RAPE, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	DECREASED	56%	32%	32%	16%
	INCREASED	17%	10%	5%	36%
	STAYED THE SAME	27%	58%	63%	48%
LOCAL POLICE CORRUPTION	DECREASED	6%	18%	17%	36%
	INCREASED	54%	15%	19%	9%
	STAYED THE SAME	39%	67%	64%	54%
THE PARTICIPATION OF THE POPULATION ON PUBLIC SECURITY DECISIONS	DECREASED	12%	16%	11%	17%
	INCREASED	29%	10%	18%	18%
	STAYED THE SAME	59%	74%	71%	65%
THE PREJUDICE AND STIGMA OF THE CITY TOWARDS THE FAVELA	DECREASED	59%	27%	19%	29%
	INCREASED	6%	10%	11%	12%
	STAYED THE SAME	35%	63%	70%	59%
LOCAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT	DECREASED	5%	9%	16%	12%
	INCREASED	66%	45%	42%	43%
	STAYED THE SAME	30%	47%	41%	45%

a) Effects of territorial control on support for the UPP

To more fully understand how territorial control and armed confrontations shape residents' evaluations of the UPP, we perform an OLS regression using the *index of support* for the UPP as a dependent variable and answers to these questions as explanatory variables. The regression controls for sociodemographic characteristics and favela of residency (coefficients not shown). Figure 10 below presents the results.

Figure 10: OLS regression: effects of territorial control on support for the UPP



NOTE: THESE ARE PREDICTED VALUES OF THE INDEX OF SUPPORT TO THE UPP DERIVED FROM AN OLS REGRESSION. THE REGRESSION CONTROLS FOR FAVELA OF RESIDENCY AND SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES (PREDICTED VALUES NOT SHOWN).

The results of the analysis reveal that the factor that impacts evaluations of the UPP the most is whether it managed to regain territorial control or not, followed by police corruption. Those who answered that the UPP did not end territorial control have significantly worse evaluations of the UPP than those who responded that it did. The magnitude of the effect is considerable, half of a standard deviation. Similarly, the difference between those who reported that the UPP increased police corruption have evaluations equivalent to almost half a standard deviation less than those who reported that the UPP decreased police corruption.

The UPP's capacity to control common crime or not also plays a very strong effect on these evaluations. Those who responded that the UPP increased common crime have significantly worse evaluations of the UPP than those who responded that the UPP decreased crime –the magnitude of the effect is equivalent to a third of a standard deviation.

The effects of the above-mentioned variables are significantly stronger than the effects of issues such as economic development, stigma and popular participation in security decisions.

b) Effects of the UPP territorial control: differences among favelas

To describe differences among favelas in terms of how the UPP performed on the dimension of territorial control, we perform three different logit models on responses to the following questions:


- 1) Whether the UPP ended territorial control by criminal groups.
- 2) If it ended the ostensive use of weapons.
- 3) If economic development increased with the arrival of the UPP.

The logit models use a dichotomous specification of the responses, where those who answered “yes” are coded as 1 and “no” or “in part” as 0. Figure 11 presents the predicted probabilities for each of these favelas. The logit models include sociodemographic characteristics, which are held at their mean values to obtain the predictions.

The figure reveals important differences among favelas in terms of territorial control. For Batan, the predicted probabilities that a resident will answer that the UPP ended territorial control of criminal groups, the ostensive use of arms and reduced armed confrontations are 0.79, 0.86, and 0.89. These are very high numbers, reflecting a strong control by the UPP of the territory, according to favela residents.

The corresponding figures for Rocinha are: 0.41, 0.46, and 0.48. These results reflect that in Rocinha territorial control is extremely contested, according to our respondents. Rocinha residents live in a situation where armed criminal groups continue to have strong control of the territory, which is now contested with the police through constant armed confrontations. These factors explain why Rocinha residents have the strongest desire for the UPP to leave their favela.

Figure 11. Predicted probabilities by favela



NOTE: THESE ARE PREDICTED PROBABILITIES DERIVED FROM THREE LOGIT MODELS. IN THE FIRST ONE, THOSE WHO ANSWERED THAT THE UPP ENDED TERRITORIAL CONTROL FROM CRIMINAL GROUPS ARE CODED AS 1, AND THE REST AS 0. A SECOND MODEL CODES AS 1 THOSE WHO ANSWERED THAT THE UPP ENDED WITH THE OSTENSIVE USE OF ARMS, AND THE REST AS 0. THE THIRD MODEL CODES AS 1 THOSE WHO RESPONDED THAT THE UPP DECREASED ARMED CONFLICTS AND THE REST ARE CODED AS 0. ALL THE MODELS INCLUDE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES (NOT SHOWN), THAT ARE HELD AT THEIR MEAN VALUES TO GENERATE THESE PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR EACH OF THE FAVELAS.

For the case of Cidade de Deus we find very similar results to Rocinha: a high incidence of armed confrontations and ostensive use of weapons and limited territorial control by the UPP. In both of these favelas, residents are often caught in the crossfire between armed criminal groups and the police.

Providência is different from these two cases in that, according to residents, the police had stronger territorial control and there were fewer armed confrontations than in Rocinha and Cidade de Deus, although Providência is significantly worse than Batan in each of these dimensions.


c) Effects of the UPP on crime , the economy, and police corruption

We now focus on three other important dimensions related to the pacification:

- 1) Whether the UPP decreased or increased common crimes.
- 2) If police corruption became worse or better.
- 3) The impact of the UPP on economic development projects.

As before, we perform three logit models for each of these questions Each of the models use a dichotomous “1,0” answer where we code as 1 “yes” and as 0 “no” and “like before.” The models control for sociodemographic characteristics. Figure 12 presents the predicted probabilities for each of the favelas holding sociodemographic characteristics at their mean values.

Figure 12. Predicted probabilities by favela



NOTE: THESE ARE PREDICTED PROBABILITIES DERIVED FROM THREE LOGIT MODELS. IN THE FIRST ONE, THOSE WHO ANSWERED THAT THE UPP INCREASED CRIMES SUCH AS THEFT OR ASSAULT WERE CODED AS 1, AND THE REST AS 0. A SECOND MODEL CODES AS 1 THOSE WHO ANSWERED THAT THE UPP INCREASED POLICE CORRUPTION, AND THE REST AS 0. THE THIRD MODEL CODES AS 1 THOSE WHO RESPONDED THAT THE UPP INCREASED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND THE REST ARE CODED AS 0. ALL THE MODELS INCLUDE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES (NOT SHOWN), THAT ARE HELD AT THEIR MEAN VALUES TO GENERATE THESE PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR EACH OF THE FAVELAS.

We can observe that Batan residents have the most positive evaluations on how the UPP impacted economic development. The model yields a 0.65 predicted probability that an average resident in Batan considers that the UPP improved the local economy and brought more social development projects. The corresponding numbers for CDD, Providência and Rocinha are 0.44, 0.44 and 0.43. Hence, on the economic dimension, CDD, Providência and Rocinha are almost identical, significantly worse than Batan.

In terms of police corruption and common crime, we find that the average resident of Rocinha is significantly more likely to respond that the UPP increased common crime and police corruption than the average resident in the rest of the favelas. Police corruption is higher in CDD and Providência than in Batan, but crime is higher in Batan than in these other favelas.

8. VICTIMIZATION

The survey asked a series of questions about victimization experienced by favela residents at the hands of the police and of criminal groups. Overall, 16% of residents told us that either a friend, someone they knew or a family member had been assassinated by a police officer; 20% of residents had either their homes invaded by a police officer or claimed that the police assaulted them or someone in their family.

In terms of victimization by criminals, 15% report that they were either mugged with a gun, knew someone assassinated by a criminal, or had their homes invaded by a criminal.³

The survey revealed that favela residents are exposed to high levels of victimization but that often the police are more prone to abuse citizens' rights than criminals. Table 6 below presents answers to a series of victimization questions. The specific question asked if during the last six months, the respondent had experienced any of the following situations.

Table 6: Victimization during the last six months

	% YES	NUMBER
HAD YOUR HOME INVADED BY POLICE OFFICERS	13	811
HAD YOUR HOME INVADED BY A CRIMINAL	3	208
FOUND YOURSELF IN THE MIDDLE OF A INTENSE SHOOTOUT	20	1225
SUFFERED AN ARMED ROBBERY	10	590
HAD A GUN POINTED IN YOUR DIRECTION	7	445
SAW CLOSELY THE BODY OF SOMEONE KILLED	10	596
WAS ASSAULTED BY A POLICE OFFICER	3	190
HAD A FAMILY MEMBER KILLED BY THE POLICE	1	76
HAD A FAMILY MEMBER ASSAULTED BY A POLICE OFFICER	4	264
HAD FAMILY MEMBERS KILLED BY CRIMINALS	2	102
HAD A FRIEND KILLED BY THE POLICE	15	931

³ WE EXCLUDE FROM THIS LIST THOSE THAT HAD AN ARMED POINTED AT THEM BECAUSE IT IS UNCLEAR IF IT IS THE ARM OF A CRIMINAL OR OF THE POLICE.

It is helpful to look at each favela's own reported rate of victimization by police and criminals. In Table 7 we see that more than double the share of the population in Maré (16%) and Rocinha (12%) report their homes being invaded by a police officer than do residents of Batan (5%) and Cidade de Deus (6%). Providência has the highest rate of home invasion by police, 26%.

If police abuse is higher in Maré, Providência and Rocinha, victimization by criminals is higher in Batan and to a lesser extent Providência. 12% of the population in Batan reports being mugged by a criminal, and 18% claim the same in Providência. This compares to 8% of people in Maré, 3% in Cidade de Deus and 9% of people in Rocinha being assaulted on the street.

There are other findings in Table 7 that are worth mentioning. For example, Batan appears to have suffered far fewer shootouts than the other favelas, with only 5% of the population reporting this experience. Maré and Cidade de Deus report high incidence of shootouts (26% and 25%, respectively). The corresponding number for Rocinha is 21% and for Providência 19%.

Batan and Rocinha report seeing far more dead bodies than the other favelas –14% and 13%, respectively, relative to 3% in Providência and 8% in Cidade de Deus.

The last row shows the number of respondents reporting killings by the police of a friend or someone they know. Batan has the highest number, 26%. The corresponding figure for Cidade de Deus is 18%, Rocinha 15%, Maré 11%, and Providência 6%.

Hence, overall in terms of victimization, Batan appears to suffer significantly fewer shootouts than the rest of the favelas, but the highest number of killings by the police. Cidade de Deus also has relatively high incidence of killings by the police and together with Maré reports the highest incidence of shootouts. In Providência we observe the highest incidence of armed robbery followed by Batan.

Rocinha has the highest number of incidents where someone points a gun in someone's direction and it also has a relatively high number of reports of shootouts and dead bodies in the street.

Table 7. Reported victimization in the last 6 months by favela

		BATAN	CDD	MARÉ	PROVIDÊNCIA	ROCINHA
HAD YOUR HOME INVADED BY POLICE OFFICERS	NO	95%	94%	84%	74%	88%
	YES	5%	6%	16%	26%	12%
WAS ASSAULTED BY A POLICE OFFICER	NO	98%	97%	96%	98%	96%
	YES	2%	3%	4%	2%	4%
HAD A FAMILY MEMBER ASSAULTED BY A POLICE OFFICER	NO	97%	95%	96%	97%	95%
	YES	3%	5%	4%	3%	5%
HAD A FAMILY MEMBER KILLED BY THE POLICE	NO	99%	99%	97%	99%	99%
	YES	1%	1%	3%	1%	1%
HAD YOUR HOME INVADED BY CRIMINALS	NO	98%	97%	94%	94%	99%
	YES	2%	3%	6%	6%	1%
SUFFERED AN ARMED ROBBERY	NO	88%	97%	92%	82%	91%
	YES	12%	3%	8%	18%	9%
HAD A FAMILY MEMBER KILLED BY CRIMINALS	NO	98%	99%	97%	100%	98%
	YES	2%	1%	3%	0%	2%
FOUND YOURSELF IN THE MIDDLE OF A INTENSE SHOOTOUT	NO	95%	75%	74%	81%	79%
	YES	5%	25%	26%	19%	21%
HAD A GUN APPOINTED IN YOUR DIRECTION	NO	17%	19%	20%	18%	26%
	YES	14%	27%	16%	7%	37%
SAW THE BODY OF SOMEONE KILLED UP CLOSE	NO	86%	92%	92%	97%	87%
	YES	14%	8%	8%	3%	13%
HAD A FRIEND OR SOMEONE YOU KNOWN ASSASSINATED	NO	74%	82%	89%	94%	85%
	YES	26%	18%	11%	6%	15%

a) Modeling police victimization

In this section we perform a statistical model to understand who is at higher risk of being victimized by the police. It is important to highlight that we do not have information on the precise nature of interaction between residents and the police – including whether a given police officer’s behavior might have been legal or legitimate. For example, when a resident reports that the police killed someone in his or her family or a friend, it is not possible to know the context of that assassination and whether the police acted beyond the law, exceeding the principles and legal restrictions for the use of lethal force.

But it is also important to highlight that many of these questions were explicitly framed with words such as “home invasion” or “assault” that suggest that, at least from residents’ perspective, the police was exceeding its authority.

Overall, 22% of respondents reported one of the following situations with the police: having their “homes invaded”; being assaulted by a police officer; having a family member “assaulted” by the police; or having a family or friend killed by the police.

To model the risk of being victimized by the police, we use a logit model where we code responses as follows: respondents who reported being a victim of at least one of the above mentioned police behaviors are coded as 1, and those who were never victimized as 0.

Overall, the strongest effects are given by favela of residency. Providência emerges as the favela where there is the highest incidence of police victimization of 0.27, followed by Maré (0.18) and Rocinha (0.18), which can't be differentiated from each other. Batan is where we observed the least risks of being victimized by the police of .09, followed by CDD, where we find a 0.12 percentage probability of suffering at least on of these forms of police aggression.

In terms of the socio-demographic effects, the results reveal that men, younger than 35 years old, with no formal schooling, that earn less than one minimum wage, who are black or pardos, and who profess no religious affiliation are at significantly higher risk of being victimized by the police.


Comparing the variables skin color, age, schooling and income, lack of formal schooling, age, and income play much stronger roles on the risk of being victimized by the police than skin color. Someone with no formal schooling has a 0.22 risk of being victimized relative to -.14 for a person with middle school. Earning less than one minimum wage yields a 0.23 risk of being victimized by the police relative to 0.14 for someone who earns more than 1 minimum wage. These are significantly stronger effects than skin color. According to the model, blacks have a 0.17 probability of being victimized by the police, pardos a 0.16 chance and whites a lower risk of 0.14.

Age is one of the strongest predictors of being victimized by the police. People from 56 to 65 and 65 or over have the lowest probabilities of being victims of any of these police aggressions of 0.12 and .08, respectively. The corresponding figures for people between 25 and 36 and 14 and 25 are 0.20 and 0.21, respectively.

Religion also plays a very significant factor, with those who profess no religious affiliation having a 0.21 predicted probability of being victimized by the police, relative to 0.14, 0.15 and 0.13 for Catholics, Evangelicals and Umbanda or Candombé.

To present the results, we transform the coefficients into predicted probabilities of being victimized by the police, as shown in Figure 13 below. The results generate an illuminating picture about how it is most likely to be victimized by the police.

Figure 13. Logit Model: predicted probability of being a victim of any police aggression



b) Victimization by criminals


In this section we perform a statistical model to understand who is at higher risk of being victimized by criminals. We make use of three questions: whether a respondent reports that during the last six months her home was invaded by a criminal, if she suffered an armed assault, or if she had a family member killed by a criminal.

The dependent variable is coded a 1 for respondents who answered “yes” to any of these questions and as 0 when the answers were “no.” The statistical model we employ is a logit, which is appropriate for analyzing dichotomous or 1,0 variables. As before, we transform the coefficients into predicted probabilities. The results are reported below.

Interestingly, in this case, most of the sociodemographic categories have limited impact on the probability of being victimized by criminals with the exception of skin color, where blacks have a much higher risk than whites and pardos. And schooling, where those with a superior education have a significantly higher probability of being victimized by criminals than any of the lower educated categories. Interestingly, in this case income is not statistically significant.

As with police victimization, the most important factor is favela of residency. Providência, once again, emerges as the favela with highest risk of being victim of a crime (0.23), followed by Batan (0.14), Maré (0.13) and Rocinha (0.11). Residents of CDD exhibit the lowest risk of being victimized by a criminal.

Figure 14. Logit Model: Predicted probabilities of being victim of crime




c) Effects of victimization on evaluations of the UPP

In general, we expect that residents will attribute responsibility to the UPP for these victimization experiences and that these experiences will be particularly damaging for the UPP if they involve police officers mistreating residents.

To evaluate these hypotheses, we perform an OLS regression on the *index of support* for the UPP, using these victimization experiences as explanatory variables, controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and favelas. The results of the model are displayed in figure 15, where we present the predicted index values of the victimization variables and their confidence intervals.

Above the red dots we can observe the predicted values for each of the explanatory variables. The green lines are the confidence intervals. As before, we draw a vertical red line at the average index value of 0.69.

Figure 15: OLS regression: index of support for the UPP and victimization



The results confirm that victimization is an important factor shaping residents' evaluations of the UPP. It is important to highlight that the strongest negative effects are related to police victimization: being assaulted by a police officer and having one's home invaded by the police show the strongest negative effects.


Moreover, the results show that suffering any form of abuse at the hands of the police invariably decreases support for the UPP, as does being in the middle of an intense shootout, having a gun pointed in one’s direction, or seeing a dead body.

Moreover, the results of the model suggest that suffering an armed assault by a criminal also reduces support for the UPP. Having a member of one’s family assassinated by a criminal has a positive effect on support for the UPP, but this variable does not reach statistical significance.

d) Victimization and wanting the UPP to stay

To have a clearer interpretation of the magnitude of the results, in this section we explore the relationship between victimization and wanting the UPP to stay in the favela. As before, we code as 1 those who want the UPP to stay and as 0 those who answered “no” or “do not know.” Figure 16 presents the predicted probabilities of wanting the UPP to stay derived from a logit model. The sociodemographic variables (not shown) are held at their mean values.

Figure 16. Logit model: predicted probabilities of wanting the UPP to stay and victimization



The results make apparent the strong impact of victimization at the hands of the police for wanting the UPP to stay or not. If a police officer assaults a resident, his or her expected desire for the UPP to stay drops from 0.46 to 0.28. If the police invades a resident's home, her desire for the UPP to stay drops from 0.48 to 0.26. If a resident has a family member assaulted by the police, her desire for the UPP to stay drops from 0.46 to 0.37. If the police kill someone the resident knows the effect goes from 0.46 to 0.40.

Other victimization experiences also have strong effects. Being in the middle of an intense shootout decreases the values from 0.48 to 0.35. If a resident sees the body of someone who was assassinated, her desire for the UPP to stay decreases from 0.46 to 0.35.

In terms of victimization by criminals, suffering an armed assault decreases the desire for the UPP to leave from 0.47 to 0.32, but having a family member assassinated by a criminal *increases* the desire for the UPP to stay, from 0.45 to 0.58. Similarly, having one's home invaded by a criminal increases the desire for the UPP to stay from 0.45 to 0.52, although this result is not statistically significant.


In terms of criminals, being violently assaulted in the street also a resident's wish that the UPP leave, but having a member of one's family killed by a criminal makes a resident want the UPP to stay.

e) Hearing about others being victimized

In addition to victimization experiences suffered by the respondent or someone in his or her family, the survey further asked questions about whether respondents had heard of forms of victimization affecting others in their community.

19% of respondents reported that they knew of someone who had been punished by drug traffickers and 20% of someone who had been killed by drug traffickers. 6.28% reported that they had heard of someone that "needed to pay bribes to criminals". A significantly larger number, 17% reported that they heard of someone who needed to pay "bribe to the police for some reason (security, energy, vehicles without documents, etc.)"

Figure 17. victimization of others in your community




To provide a sense of how favelas differ on the incidence of these forms of victimization, we perform four logit models where answers are coded as 1 or 0 for “yes” and “no” responses, respectively. Each model includes socio-demographic categories (not shown), which are set at their mean values, as well as an indicator for favela of residency.

In figure 18 below, we present the average predicted probabilities for favela of paying a bribe to criminals and to the police derived from two logit models. The results are revealing about differing patterns of police and criminal extortion in the different territories.

CDD is where most residents report paying the police for some reason, followed by Rocinha. Providência is where we observe the least incidence of police extortion, and Marè and Batan are in between.

In terms of criminal extortion, Batan and Marè are where residents need to pay more to criminals for protection, and CDD, Providência and Rocinha the least.


Figure 18. Paying bribes to criminals and to the police



To explore differences among the favelas in terms of crimes inflicted by drug traffickers, we perform an analogous exercise as in the previous figure, which presents predicted probabilities for each favela that come from two logit models using the questions about sanctions and homicides inflicted by drug traffickers.

Figure 19 presents the predicted probabilities for each of the favelas, holding the socio-demographic characteristics at the mean values. Providência is clearly the favela with fewer assassinations by drug traffickers and also where there are fewer residents punished by armed criminal groups. Maré is where more people have heard of someone punished by drug traffickers. In terms of someone killed by drug traffickers, Maré has a higher incidence than Batan, CDD, and Rocinha, although these predicted rates can't be distinguished from each other in statistically meaningful ways.

Figure 19. Probabilities to each favela for crimes inflicted by drug traffickers



9. FEAR

Beyond victimization, our data reveal that living in fear, dreading that the police or armed criminal groups would damage, cause pain or destroy one’s life or family, is a common aspect of life for many favela residents.

The survey asked a series of questions to understand the extent to which favela residents worry about being victimized. The survey asked respondents to think how “frequently during the last six months they “worried” about a series of problems, which we report in table 8 below. The column on the left groups questions related to fear of police and the ones on the right to fear of criminals.

With respect to police, favela residents constantly feel endangered: 28% report that they frequently worry about “being killed by the police,” 25% about “being assaulted” by a police officer, 22% told us that they frequently worry about “have a crime forged by the police” and 19% report that they are worried about “being confused with a criminal.”

Related to criminal groups, the most common fear reported by 39% of respondents is “having a family member involved with drug traffickers.” With respect to criminal groups, the second most common fear cited by 26% of respondents is “suffering retaliation or extortion from criminal groups.”

The data reveal that a sizable number of favela residents experience both criminal groups and the police as a source of danger, apprehension and pain.

Table 8: How frequently during the last six months did you worry about:

POLICE AGGRESSION		SUFFER RETALIATION AND EXTORTION BY CRIMINALS	
NEVER	30,9	NEVER	30,8
RARELY	13,1	RARELY	15,5
SOMETIMES	30,7	SOMETIMES	27,5
ALWAYS	25,3	ALWAYS	26,2
BEING MISTAKEN AS A CRIMINAL		FAMILY MEMBER GET INVOLVED IN TRAFFICKING	
NEVER	42,7	NEVER	23,8
RARELY	13,8	RARELY	13,9
SOMETIMES	24,4	SOMETIMES	23,5
ALWAYS	19,1	ALWAYS	38,8
POLICE PLANTING EVIDENCE ON YOU		SUFFER A ROBBERY ON THE STREET	
NEVER	38,3	NEVER	50,5
RARELY	13,3	RARELY	18
SOMETIMES	26,9	SOMETIMES	17,9
ALWAYS	21,5	ALWAYS	13,6
BEING KILLED BY THE POLICE		CRIMINAL VIOLENCE	
NEVER	31,9	NEVER	30,8
RARELY	14,7	RARELY	15,5
SOMETIMES	24,9	SOMETIMES	27,5
ALWAYS	28,5	ALWAYS	26,2

10. POLICE BEHAVIOR

Table 9 presents answers to a series of questions about police behavior, including honesty, violence, manners, training, and aggressiveness.

In terms of police honesty, most residents agree that only the minority of police officers are honest. Batan has the most positive evaluations: 34% answered that the “majority” of police officers are honest and 27% that the minority are. Rocinha and Maré have the most negative evaluations regarding police honesty: 47% of residents in both of these communities say that “only the minority” of police officers are honest. The corresponding figures for Providência and CDD are 40% and 34%, respectively.

In terms of police violence, 33% of respondents told us that the majority of police officers are violent and 28% that the minority are. Maré residents are significantly more likely to respond that the police are violent than the rest of the communities where a UPP was assigned. In Maré 45% responded that the majority of police officers are violent, relative to 18%, 25%, 32%, and 38% in Batan, Providência, CDD, and Rocinha, respectively.

In terms of manners which might reflect issues such as whether police officers treat residents with respect, 37% of respondents told us that “the minority of police officers have good manners”. Batan shows the most positive evaluations, with 39% of respondents answering that police officers have good manners and treat residents with respect. The worst assessments on this dimension are from Providência (13%), followed by Rocinha (15%) and then Maré (18%).

In terms of training, only 16% of respondents told us that the police are well trained. The most negative evaluations on this dimension are from Maré and CDD, where 51% and 49%, respectively, told us that only the minority of police officers are well trained.

Lastly, residents are evenly split regarding the issue of police aggressiveness, with 33% saying that the majority are aggressive and 30% that the minority are. Maré and Rocinha stand out: in these communities 46% and 39%, respectively, tell us that the majority of police officers are abusive. The corresponding number for Batan and Providência is 20% and for CDD is 33%.

Table 9. Police behavior

		BATAN	CDD	PROVIDÊNCIA	MARÉ	ROCINHA
HONEST	THE MINORITY	26,81	33,73	39,69	47,12	46,64
	HALF & HALF	39,17	50,13	47,24	35,51	44,21
	THE MAJORITY	34,03	16,15	13,07	17,38	9,15
VIOLENT	THE MINORITY	50,89	26,35	23,96	24,29	21,83
	HALF & HALF	30,93	41,47	51,01	30,76	39,8
	THE MAJORITY	18,18	31,99	25,02	44,96	38,37
POLITE	THE MINORITY	27,21	33,33	35,47	46,4	39,9
	HALF & HALF	33,3	36,95	51,45	35,2	44,62
	THE MAJORITY	39,49	29,71	13,08	18,39	15,48
WELL-TRAINED	THE MINORITY	37,25	48,78	37,56	50,84	37,73
	HALF & HALF	40,91	35,38	48,79	32,3	49,94
	THE MAJORITY	21,84	15,84	13,65	16,84	12,33
AGGRESSIVE & ABUSIVE	THE MINORITY	50,15	30,26	23,93	24,75	23,92
	HALF & HALF	29,71	36,52	56,1	29,14	36,73
	THE MAJORITY	20,14	33,22	19,96	46,11	39,35

Hence, looking beyond the UPP and turning to the public's opinions regarding the police more generally, we see similar trends in opinion among the favelas. Batan typically has the most positive feelings towards the UPP and the police, while Rocinha has strongly negative feelings. Even more than Rocinha residents, in Maré we find the most negative assessments about police behavior.

a) Index of police trust

With the use of these questions regarding police behavior, we created an index of residents' trust to the police. To construct the index, we also used the Cronbach alpha to measure the internal consistency of the index or how closely the items are correlated. In this case the alpha coefficient is 0.80, a good value for an index.

We conclude that using the series of questions about police behavior presented above in a single measure has internal consistency and can be used to model residents' evaluations of the police. The measure is based on how residents evaluate the police on behaviors such as corruption, training, manners, violence, and aggressiveness.

Table 10. Index of Evaluation of Police Behavior


	MEAN	STD. DEV
BATAN	0,3682	0,7886
CDD	0,0235	0,8
PROVIDÊNCIA	0,002	0,6474
ROCINHA	-0,1257	0,6907
MARÉ	-0,1548	0,7597
TOTAL	0,002	0,7583

The index goes from a minimum of -1.22 to a maximum of 1.66. The mean value for all favelas is 0.028. The average value for the favelas is, from lowest to highest, Maré (-0.15) Rocinha (-0.13), Providência (.002), CDD (.02) and Batan (0.37).

It is convenient to understand who has better assessments of police behavior. We use the index as a dependent variable for an OLS regression, where we use the sociodemographic variables and an indication for favela.

In addition, we employ questions about whether the respondent trusts people in his or her community, which likely is correlated with trust to the police. The reason to expect this is that people who are inherently more trusting, might exhibit more trust regardless of whether we are talking about the police or other people in the community. Results are shown in figure 20 below.

Figure 20. OLS regression: index of trust in the police



The model reveals that age, skin color, and religion are statistically significant, with blacks and pardos, younger people, and those with no religion or who adhere to Umbanda or Candomblé having worse evaluations about police behavior and least trust in the police. Having a friend or family member who is a police officer increases trust in the police and evaluations about them. Gender, having children, marital status, schooling, and income are statistically insignificant.


In terms of experiences of victimization, not surprisingly we observe that being a victim of one form of police aggression has a very strong negative impact on the index of evaluations of police behavior. Other victimization experiences, including where a criminal or drug traffickers are the perpetrators, decrease evaluations about the police. Among these victimization experiences, the only variable that has a positive impact on evaluations of the police is knowing someone who needs to pay for criminal groups for protection.

In terms of favelas, Batan has the most positive evaluations, Rocinha and Mare the worst and CDD and Providência in between.

b) Index of trust in the police and victimization

We explore the relationship between the index of trust in the police and victimization. We include the set of victimization experiences a respondent directly suffered as well as what he or she has heard about others.

Figure 21. OLS regression: index of trust in the police and victimization



The results confirm that suffering any form of abuse from the police reduces trust. The strongest effects are for having one’s “home invaded by the police,” followed by having a family member or close friend killed by the police or suffering from police aggression. It is import to highlight that when residents hear that others paid bribes to the police this also reduces trust.

In terms of criminals, we find that having someone in the family killed by criminals increases trust in the police and the impact is quite strong. Knowing someone who paid criminals for protection and punished by criminals also increases trust in the police. By contrast, suffering an armed robbery decreases trust in the police.


c) Police behavior and UPP evaluation

In terms of how police behavior shapes evaluations of the UPP, the following graph presents the results of a logit model of the question of whether the UPP should stay or not. As before, we code as 1 those who answer that they want the UPP to leave, yes and as 0 those who said no or don't know.

It becomes transparent that if residents observe that the police are honest, not violent, treat residents with respect, are well trained and are not abusive or aggressive, they are significantly more likely to want the UPP to stay in their favela. The results (not shown) are almost identical when using the index of support for the UPP.

The results reveal that the factor that matters to residents the most is police honesty/corruption. Among those who thought that the majority of police officers are honest, 0.64 do not want it to leave. This number drops to 0.34 among those who answered that the majority of police officers are dishonest.


Figure 22. Logit model: police behavior and UPP evaluations



11. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND COMMUNITY TRUST


In terms of social capital, the survey asked a series of questions about whether favela residents trust each other and how much they are willing to contribute to collective goods. We found exceedingly high levels of trust. 57% of favela residents reported that they trust members of their community and 75% that they feel they can count on their neighbors. This runs counter to common notions among outsiders that favelas are places of high social dysfunction.

Figure 23. Community trust



In terms of differences among favelas, we find significantly lower levels of community trust in Batan, where only 41% responded that they trust their community. The corresponding numbers for Maré 56% and for Rocinha, Providência and CDD are 57.5%, 66% and 63%, respectively. We also find lower level of trust to neighbors in Batan (63%) and Maré (68%), relative to Providência (82%), Rocinha (75%) and CDD (82%).


Figure 24. Community trust by favela



The survey further asked how often respondents engage in collective activities, including participating in community meetings to discuss problems or improvements for the community, help organize sport, cultural or religious events, and engaging in social work related to the community, among others.

Among these activities, the most commonly cited by close to 16% of respondents is participating in religious events, followed by close to 12% who told us they the participated in community meetings, and 8% in cultural events.

Figure 25. Collective activities in the community



12. SECURITY OF DAILY ACTIVITIES


The high presence of criminal groups and, in some favelas, the frequent confrontations that take place between these and the police make many residents feel insecure and fearful about their daily routines.

The survey asked a series of questions about everyday activities and whether residents felt secure or insecure. Figure 26 presents the responses.

Close to 40% reported that they “never” or “rarely” feel safe to let their kids go out. More than 40% report that they “never” or “rarely” feel safe sending their kids to school. More than 50% “never” or “rarely” feel safe going to a bar in the night, and a similar percentage tells us that they do not feel safe visiting friends or family, or going to work.

Among these activities, going to a funk dance is considered the least safe activity, with more than 55% reporting that they “never” or “rarely” feel safe. The second most risky activity is to visit a friend or a family member and to going to work.


Figure 26. Security during daily activities



We use the Cronbach's alpha to estimate the reliability of an index of insecurity that uses responses to all of these questions. In this case the alpha coefficient is 0.90, which is extremely high. We hence can conclude that the index has internal consistency and that it can be used to measure daily insecurity of basic activities.

The following histogram presents the *index of insecurity for each of the favelas*. The index goes from -1.2 (most secure) to 3 (1.8 most insecure). The average score for the total sample of favela residents is -.039 and its standard deviation is 0.77. The average indexes for the favelas, going from most to least secure, are: CDD (-.25), Rocinha (-0.10), Providência (-.06), Maré (-0.026) and Batan is (0.31). Hence, according to these data, Batan residents feel least secure in their daily activities, with CDD and Rocinha being most secure.

Figure 27.



To further explore this important aspect of how secure favela residents feel in their daily routines, we perform an OLS regression of the index of insecurity.

The results reveal that women feel significantly more insecure in their daily routines than men. Single people feel more insecure than the rest. Those who have children feel significantly more insecure than those who don't.

Interestingly, age has no statistically significant impact on feelings of insecurity. While young people tend to be victimized at a much higher rate both by the police and criminals, their natural optimism is reflected in the fact that in their daily routines they do not feel more insecure than the rest of the population. People older than 65 years feel significantly less insecure than the rest.

Whites report feeling more secure than both pardos and blacks, who are the most insecure. Those with some religion feel less insecure than those with no religion. In terms of income and education, we find that richer and higher educated residents tend to slightly more insecure, although these variables do not reach statistical significance.

Figure 28. OLS regression:
Index of insecurity




In terms of place of residence, the most insecure are those from Batan and the least insecure are those from CDD, with the rest of the favelas somewhere in between. Hence while in Batan residents report lower levels of victimization at the hands of the police and also higher levels of satisfaction with the UPP, they feel most insecure in their daily routines than residents in the rest of the favelas.

a) Feeling of insecurity and police behavior

It is worth exploring the correlation between the index of insecurity and police behavior. We perform an OLS analysis using the index of insecurity as dependent variable and answers to the series of questions about police behavior. The results are presented in figure 28 below.

Figure 29. OLS regression: Index of insecurity and police behavior



Importantly, when residents tell us that the police are honest, well-trained, and that cops are polite they feel significantly less insecure. Police aggressiveness has an intriguing U-shape effect: residents feel more secure when they report that the “majority” are aggressive and more insecure when they can’t tell if they majority or minority are aggressive. In other words, police aggressiveness is not always correlated with a higher feeling of insecurity. Importantly, police violence has no statistical significant effect.

In terms of victimization, not surprisingly every experience increases the sense of insecurity by a significant amount with the exception of “knowing people who pay to criminals for protection”, which has a positive but statistically insignificant effect (results not shown).

13. OPINIONS: WHEN IS POLICE VIOLENCE JUSTIFIED?

To analyze the circumstances under which favela residents believe if police violence is more justifiable under certain circumstances, we conducted two what can be called “priming” experiments. “Priming” is defined as the passive, elusive, and unobtrusive activation of relevant mental representations by external, environmental stimuli, such that people may not be or become aware of the influence exerted by those inducements (Bargh & Huan, 2004).

Our first experiment consisted of introducing two survey items describing different scenarios in which the police fired and killed a suspect. Different descriptions and different pictures accompanied these scenarios. We randomly assign respondents to two groups. Both groups were asked to indicate their level of agreement with a sentence that stated: “police officers acted correctly in that situation”. Possible answers were the following: 1. Strongly agree, 2. Agree, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Disagree, 5. Strongly disagree.

In the first item, the story started, for both groups, as follows: “Two police officers encountered two young suspects who started running. The police demanded that suspects stop, but the young men continued running and turned into an alley. Police officers ran behind the suspects and ordered them to stop again, but when the police realized the suspects were getting away they fired at them various times. One of the suspects was killed and the other one wounded.”

Only the following sentence and images differed for both conditions: In Group one (the Purse and I-Pad condition), the last sentence of the paragraph and the picture were as follows: “When police officers inspected the suspects’ backpacks, they found a purse, a wallet, money and an I-Pad.”

As for Group two (the Gun and Drug condition), these were the corresponding items: “When police officers inspected the suspects’ backpacks, they found drugs, a radio, a revolver, and money”.

Figure 1. Purse and I-Pad




Figure 2. Gun and Drug



Regardless of which specific group the respondents were assigned to, shooting suspects in any of both situations is unwarranted and can be considered an unjustified use of deadly force. In neither situation were suspects directly putting the lives of police officers (or other citizens) at immediate risk, considering they were fleeing. Hence, lethal force should not be used, according to international principles already incorporated into Brazilian national norms.⁴

Table 11 shows the percentage of residents who agree or disagree that the police acted correctly shooting the suspects for the Drugs and Gun group and the Purse and I-Pad group.

Table 11. Distribution of residents' answers by treatment

STATEMENT	TREATMENT GROUP	TOTALLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	RESPONDENTS' RESPONSES (%)		
				NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE	AGREE	TOTALLY AGREE
POLICE OFFICERS ACTED CORRECTLY IN THIS SITUATION	TABLET E PURSE	13,6%	42,7%	27,2%	13,1%	3,5%
	DRUGS AND GUN	9,1%	39,2%	27,3%	18,4%	5,9%
THE USE OF FORCE BY POLICE OFFICERS WERE EXCESSIVE IN THIS SITUATION	TABLET E PURSE	3,8%	10,7%	23,6%	50,2%	11,7%
	DRUGS AND GUN	3,4%	15,9%	25,8%	45,4%	9,6%
BRAZIL SHOULD LEGALIZE DRUGS	TABLET E PURSE	37,1%	26,2%	16,0%	13,5%	7,2%
	DRUGS AND GUN	37,2%	26,3%	18,4%	11,7%	6,8%
THE POLICE WHEN POSSIBLE SHOULD ARREST RATHER THAN KILL	TABLET E PURSE	2,0%	2,6%	18,0%	50,2%	27,1%
	DRUGS AND GUN	1,7%	3,5%	19,0%	51,3%	24,5%

Overall, favela residents significantly disagree with the affirmation that “police officers acted correctly in that situation”. Around 56% of respondents in Condition 1 (Purse and I-Pad) disagree with the affirmation compared to 48% in condition 2 (Drugs and Gun). Respondents exposed to the picture of drugs and guns are slightly more likely to agree that the police acted correctly (24.3%) compared to those exposed to the purse and I-Pad picture (16.6%).

⁴) ANOTHER IMPORTANT ASPECT IS THAT OFFICERS IN THE STORY DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS INSIDE THE SUSPECTS' BACKPACK WHEN THEY FIRED. HENCE, THEIR BEHAVIOR CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF WHAT THEY FOUND AFTER THEY FIRED BUT SHOULD BE EVALUATED ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION AND THE RISKS THAT WERE APPARENT AT THE TIME THEY DECIDED TO USE THEIR FIREARMS.

These results were significantly different when the same experiment was conducted with around 6,000 police officers from the Military State Police of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ) in 2014. PMERJ officers were more likely to believe that the police acted correctly when shooting suspects who carried drugs and an arm, compared to a similar situation in which suspects carried a Purse and an I-Pad. In other words, priming the police in terms of guns and drugs increases their agreement with the use of (unjustified) lethal force: 18.3% of the group who saw the Drugs and Gun agreed with the statement that said the police acted correctly vs. 5.1% in the ‘Purse and I-Pad’ group (Magaloni and Cano, 2015).

When residents were asked to agree or disagree with the affirmation that the “police used excessive force in this situation,” 62% of respondents assigned to the Condition 1 (Purse and I-Pad) agreed, compared to 55% in Condition 2 (Drugs and Gun). Once again we notice a slight difference among the groups, suggesting that respondents’ level of agreement is minimally affected when arms and drugs are present in the treatment.

To understand residents’ perceptions about factors that can trigger police violence or contribute to the increase of criminal violence in general, this experiment included a question about drugs legalization in Brazil. Even though there is practically no difference in responses between the iPad/Tablet and Drugs/Arms treatments, the results revealed that favela residents are against drug legalization as much as other people who are not violently and directly affected by its illegal status.

Although drug trafficking and consumption are among the highest reasons for police violence, racial profiling and arrests that affects favela residents’ lives overall, the results showed that 63% of respondents disagree that “Brazil should legalize drugs.” In 2014, a survey to gather public opinion revealed that 79% of Brazilians opposed the legalization of marijuana⁵. This result reveals that residents of favelas are also conservative with respect to drug-related polices.

Using a similar “framing” exercise to gather perceptions about police use of force, another story was introduced to our participants from groups A and B. In the first item, the story started, for both groups, as follows: “Marcelo was 24 years old when he was killed by the police during a police operation”. On the second and third line, we introduce different information to both groups: “He was with a group of men (group A)/ group of drug traffickers (group B) when officers were getting prepared to do an incursion in a Rio’s favela. Marcelo had a fuzil (group A)/ No fuzil (group B).

The last part of the story remains the same for both groups. “When he tried to escape an officer shot him and wounded his arm. The rest of the group escaped. When Marcelo was fallen injured on the street the officer approached him and shot Marcelo again. He agonized for 20 minutes and died.”

⁵ SOURCE IBOPE, 2014.

This experiment seeks to expose if respondents would react differently to police violence after receiving the information of drug traffickers vs. gun presence (fuzil). The idea was to narrate two alternative stories in which there was some hint of Marcelo being a criminal, one because of his relationship with drug traffickers and the other because he was carrying a gun.

Remarkably, participants on experiments A (a group of men/fuzil) and B (a group of traffickers) responded in a very similar way to the different treatments introduced in Marcelo's narrative. In other words, there are no significant findings across the groups and the different pieces added to the stories (See table 12 below).

Although the experiment reveals a negative impact across the groups, the responses still offer important insights about residents' perceptions of police violence. While favela residents have historically been victims of police brutality and arbitrary use of force due to association with drug trafficking in these territories, there is still a high percentage of interviewees that holds an opinion that police actions must be severe when related to criminals.

As shown in table 12, although the majority of respondents disagree with the statement "the police acted correctly in this situation (47%), almost 30% of residents interviewed revealed that they were in agreement with police act towards Marcelo. Interestingly, the results imply that both groups might have perceived Marcelo as criminal regarding the presence of guns in group A or his association with drug traffickers in group B.

The following question on table 2 reveals that residents perceived police actions as excessive. Around 52% of residents agreed with the statement "the use of force by the police was excessive," followed by around 25% that neither agree nor disagree and around 20% that agrees with the police's use of force.

In general, Brazilian society is extremely conservative in opinion about policies to punish criminals. Historically, fear has driven the upper and middle classes to constantly push for tough public security policies and strategies to deal with the rise of crimes that have affected the country as a whole since the 80s.

Interestingly, conservative opinion about penalizing criminals have surpassed the realm of formal policies to the perception that justice should be done with "society's" own hands. Unfortunately, the approval of informal actions to promote "justice," such as public lynchings and mass massacres have been, in a certain way, socially justifiable in the name of public security.

Table 12. Distribution of residents' answers by treatment

STATEMENT	TREATMENT GROUP	TOTALLY DISAGREE	RESPOSTA DOS ENTREVISTADOS (%)			
			DISAGREE	NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE	AGREE	TOTALLY AGREE
POLICE OFFICERS ACTED CORRECTLY IN THIS SITUATION	MARCELO WAS CARRYING FUZIL	16,0%	31,4%	25,0%	21,4%	6,7%
	MARCELO WAS WITH A GROUP OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS	12,9%	31,0%	26,0%	23,0%	6,8%
THE USE OF FORCE BY POLICE OFFICERS WERE EXCESSIVE IN THIS SITUATION	MARCELO WAS CARRYING FUZIL	4,7%	19,2%	24,1%	37,6%	14,5%
	MARCELO WAS WITH A GROUP OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS	5,2%	20,2%	25,3%	36,4%	13,0%
A GOOD CRIMINAL IS A DEAD CRIMINAL	MARCELO WAS CARRYING FUZIL	31,2%	32,2%	23,6%	8,9%	4,1%
	MARCELO WAS WITH A GROUP OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS	31,0%	32,0%	22,7%	9,5%	4,8%
THE POLICE SHOULD HAVE OFFERED ASSISTANCE TO MARCELO TO TRY SAVING HIS LIFE	MARCELO WAS CARRYING FUZIL	2,5%	6,8%	17,4%	51,5%	22,5%
	MARCELO WAS WITH A GROUP OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS	2,4%	7,8%	19,0%	49,1%	21,6%
THIS IS A VERY COMMON SITUATION IN THE FAVELAS	MARCELO WAS CARRYING FUZIL	5,4%	23,7%	36,6%	27,6%	6,7%
	MARCELO WAS WITH A GROUP OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS	5,2%	24,8%	36,8%	26,5%	6,7%

With that being said, the high acceptance rate of the popular saying “a good criminal is a dead criminal” impressively reflects where Brazilian society stands. While 50% of Brazilians agree with this statement, favela residents have a different opinion. As shown in table 12 above, only 13% of favelas’ dwellers agreed with the popular saying.


A high level of agreement to this popular saying is also true at the Military State Police of Rio de Janeiro (42%), but still, below the percentage shown in the overall society (Magaloni and Cano, 2015).

When residents were questioned if “the police should have offered assistance to Marcelo to try saving his life,” most respondents (75%) agreed with the statement. The last question on table 12 reveals how favelas’ residents are highly exposed to events similar to Marcelo story.

Around 36% of residents agreed with the statement “this is a very common situation in the favelas,” confirming that events involving excessive police use of force are relatively frequent in these territories. Noticeably, residents’ perceptions and responses to this specific territorial issue vary from place to place.

The graph below shows that CDD residents highly agreed that situations of police violence and excessive use of force, such as described for Marcelo, are usual in their community (51%), while only 8% of respondents in Batan agreed with the statement. Rocinha (41%) followed by Maré (35%), also report perception of high levels of violent and arbitrary events in their territories. Once again, it is important to highlight that in both stories described in the experiment, Marcelo was already wounded on the street when the police shot him one more time, characterizing the act as an execution according to international standards.

Figure 30. Frequency that this type of events occurs in your favela



NOTE: THIS "TYPE OF EVENTS" REFERS TO MARCELO'S STORY.

Table 13 shows favela resident opinions about other topics related to public security. When asked about the reduction of the legal age of criminal responsibility for homicides from age 18 to 16 in Brazil, 52% of respondents were favorable to the 2015 law, followed by 24.1% who neither agree nor disagree and 23.2% who disagree. Before answering these questions, our participants were informed that “Brazil is the fourth country with the highest prison population and most of them are youth from 18-25 years.”

The next question on table 13 inquired if drug trafficking and theft should also be part of the legal age reduction. Surprisingly, the majority of the participants agreed with the statement “the reduction of the legal age for criminal responsibility should include crimes related to drug trafficking and robbery” (56%). Interestingly, laws that create severe punishments for youth crimes, especially drug trafficking, directly affect underprivileged young people particularly black from age 14-17. Currently, 28% of the prison population in Brazil is convicted of drug-related crimes. Arrests for drug trafficking drastically grew from 2005 (8%) to 2014 (28%) due to a law approved in 2016 that distinguishes the user from traffickers.

With an incarceration rate that reaches 300 people per 100.000, the prisons in Brazil have not historically been an environment to rehabilitate convicts. Overcrowding jails, extreme violence, drug factions turf wars inside the prisons, and lack of strong reintegration policies have turned the Brazilian incarceration system into a failed structure. Question 3 shows favela residents' opinion about improving the quality of life for prisoners. 42% of respondents disagreed with the statement “the society should not spend more money to improve prisoners’ quality of life”, followed by 23.7% who neither agreed nor disagreed. 34% agreed with the statement.

Table 13. Residents’ perceptions of other public security issues

STATEMENT	RESPONDENTS' RESPONSES (%)				
	TOTALLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE	AGREE	TOTALLY AGREE
THE REDUCTION OF THE LEGAL AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FROM 18 TO 16 APPROVED BY THE LEGISLATIVE IN 2015 FOR HOMICIDES AND VIOLATIONS	8,4%	14,8%	24,1%	31,8%	21,0%
THE REDUCTION OF THE LEGAL AGE FOR CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY SHOULD INCLUDE CRIMES RELATED TO DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ROBBERY	5,8%	14,4%	23,9%	36,8%	19%
SOCIETY SHOULD NOT SPEND MONEY TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR PRISONERS	13,4%	28,6%	23,7%	25,9%	8,5%

14. CONCLUSION

This study explored the set of complex feelings the police inspire in residents of favelas. When residents relate their feelings toward the police, they mostly use harsh language. Favela residents “fear” and “distrust” the police and often describe their feelings toward this institution as “revolting,” “abusive,” “terrorizing,” and deserving of “hate,” although some residents refer to the police with “respect” and “admiration.”

This report uncovers important variation of feelings toward the police depending on sociodemographic categories such as skin color, age, income, marital status, religion, education levels, and favela of residence. This report also provides an understanding of what accounts for favela residents’ support or opposition to the UPP, how the “pacification” impacted police behavior toward community and public security more broadly, and who is at a higher risk of being victimized by the police and by criminal groups.

The UPP was meant to weaken the territorial control by armed criminal groups. One of the main goals of the project was to “gain back” these territories from criminal groups by providing a permanent police presence that would monopolize the use of violence in the favelas. On top of these major goals, the UPPs were seen by many, both inside and outside the police, as a chance to change the relationship between the Military Police and residents of the favelas, from a militaristic approach based on periodic military “invasions” of the slums to a form of community-oriented policing.

In terms of evaluations of the UPP, our study revealed that residents have markedly different evaluations of the UPP depending on favela. In Batan, 60% of the population believes that the UPP was a positive development for favela residents. In Rocinha, by contrast, more than 40% disagree that the UPP was a force for good. Providência and the CDD are in the middle, with 20% and 30%, respectively, believing that the UPP was positive.

However, while the assessments of the UPP are far from uniformly positive, respondents across the board are hesitant to say the UPP should leave. In Batan 74% do not believe that the UPP should leave, and the corresponding figure for CDD and Providência are 56% and 37%, respectively. In Rocinha 30% want to see the UPP go, 27% to stay, and 43% are uncertain.

What accounts for these differing evaluations about the UPP? How can we explain residents’ trust/distrust of the Military Police more broadly? The following are some of the main results of the study.

Positive evaluations of the UPP are strongly influenced by the police’ capacity to regain territorial control from criminal groups and the consequent reduction of armed confrontations between the police and criminal groups.

Overall, Batan residents have significantly more favorable opinions of the UPP because, according to our respondents, the UPP was better able to regain territorial control, decrease armed confrontations between the police and criminal groups and end the ostensive use of weapons. By contrast, in the rest of the favelas, and particularly in Rocinha and Cidade de Deus, the UPP failed to regain territorial control, which remains extremely contested between the police and heavily armed criminal groups. In these settings, residents live in fear, caught in between intense shootouts between the police and the armed criminal groups, and hence have negative evaluations of the UPP.

Victimization at the hands of the police plays a powerful role in shaping how residents evaluate the UPP. Overall, 16% of residents told us that either a friend, someone they knew or a family member had been assassinated by a police officer; 20% of residents had either their homes “invaded” by a police officer or said that the police “assaulted” them or someone in their family. Not surprisingly, these victimization experiences turn residents against the UPP and the Military Police more broadly.

If a police officer assaults a resident, his or her expected desire for the UPP stay in the favela drops from 0.46 to 0.28. If the police invade a resident’s home, her desire for the UPP to stay drops from 0.48 to 0.26. If a resident has a family member assaulted by the police, her desire for the UPP to stay drops from 0.46 to 0.37. If the police kill someone the resident knows the effect goes from 0.46 to 0.40.

In terms of victimization by criminals, 15% report that they were either mugged with a gun, knew someone assassinated by a criminal or had their homes invaded by a criminal. If a criminal kills a family member, residents evaluate the UPP more positively, although when they are mugged in the street, their feelings toward the UPP become more negative.

In terms of who is at a higher risk of being victimized by the police, the results reveal that men, younger than 35 years old, with no formal schooling, who earn less than one minimum wage, who are black or pardos, and who profess no religious affiliation are at significantly higher risk of being victimized by the police. Comparing these variables, we find that age, lack of formal schooling, religion, and income play stronger roles on the risk of being victimized by the police than skin color.

In terms of incidence of police victimization by favela of residency, we find the highest incidence in Providência, followed by Maré and Rocinha. The lowest risks were found in Batan, which is three times lower than in Providência, and then Cidade de Deus. In terms of victimization by criminals, the highest risks were found in Providência, followed by Batan and Maré. The lowest risks were found in Cidade de Deus and then Rocinha.

In addition to police violence, the results reveal that the factor that matters to residents the most is police honesty/corruption. Among those who thought that the majority of police officers are honest, 0.64 do not want the UPP to leave. This number drops to 0.34 among those who answered that the majority of police officers are dishonest.

The high presence of criminal groups and, in some favelas, the frequent confrontations that take place between these and the police make many residents feel insecure and fearful about their daily routines, including taking their kids to school, letting them play in the street, and visiting other areas.

The results reveal that women feel more insecure in their daily routines than men. Blacks and pardos feel significantly more insecure than whites. Those with some religion feel less insecure than those with no religion. Importantly, when residents tell us that the police are honest, well-trained, and that police officers are respectful and polite they feel less insecure in their daily routines.

In terms of place of residence, while Batan residents report lower levels of victimization at the hands of the police and also higher levels of satisfaction with the UPP, they feel more insecure in their daily routines than residents in the rest of the favelas.

Batan residents also report the lowest levels of community trust and trust to their neighbors – in this favela only 41% responded that they trust their community. The corresponding numbers for Marè 56% and for Rocinha, Providência and CDD are 58%, 66% and 63%, respectively. It is important to highlight the high levels of community trust and social capital that persists in these areas.

Among many crucial results, this study reveals that many residents still perceive the UPP as a project that should remain in their community despite its limitations. Apparently, residents' perceptions imply that a total failure of the UPP – which would imply removing the UPP units from the favelas - would be a significant retrocession to public security. Although the “pacification” project failed to promote citizenship and security, there is a common understanding that it is still needed among favela residents—even though the project needs plenty of improvements, conceptually and strategically.

Importantly, residents distrust the police when they report that officers are poorly trained, dishonest, aggressive, and abusive. When residents tell us that the police are honest, well-trained, and that police officers have good manners they feel less insecure in their daily routines and they also support the UPP and the Military Police more broadly.

Beyond evaluations of the UPP and the Military Police, our data explored residents' attitudes toward law enforcement and police use of lethal force. Through the use of some “priming” experiments, we learned that within the favelas there is a considerable percentage of the population that approves of the use of excessive use of force by the police when dealing with armed criminals and/or drug traffickers.

Our research exposed, moreover, that 52% of the population agrees that legal age should be reduced to 16 years old and controversially that the reduction of the legal age for criminal responsibility should include crimes related to drug trafficking and robbery. These results shed light on important issues about how society perceives punishment to criminal regardless of territory or social and economic status.

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Appendix:

This appendix presents the results of an ordered probit model related to the question of whether the UPP should leave or not. In the main text and because of ease of interpretation, we performed a logit model, grouping answers to this question as follows: those who answered that they did not want the UPP to leave where coded as 1 and those who answered “do not know” and “yes” as 0.

However, given the high percentage of “do not know” answers and the fact that these are different from “yes” answers, the most appropriate model is what is known as an ordered probit that is used for categorical variables that can be ordered. In this case, we can assume that answers can be ordered from most supportive (UPP should not leave) to least supportive (UPP should leave), with “do not know” answers in between these two. To perform the ordered probit, we hence code responses as follows: “no” answers are coded as 2, “do not know” as 1, and “yes” as 0.

The figure below presents the results of the model. The coefficients are ordered log-odds estimates for a one unit increase in a given explanatory variable on the expected level of response (0 to 2) to the question about whether the UPP should not leave given the other variables are held constant in the model. For example, if a resident is a woman, relative to a man, her ordered log-odds of being in a higher category would increase by 0.05 while the other variables in the model are held constant.

The model’s main results are:

- . Women are significantly more likely to want the UPP to stay.
- . Relative to married couples (the omitted category), singles, widows, and divorced couples are more inclined to want the UPP to stay.
- . Those who have children are *more* likely to want the UPP to leave than those with no children.
- . Age has a very strong impact on wanting the UPP to leave or stay. Those between 14 to 25 years old consistently have a stronger preference for the UPP to leave, relative to the older groups.
- . Relative to white, blacks consistently have a stronger preference for the UPP to leave.
- . Pardos and whites can’t be distinguished from each other on this question.
- . Evangelicals and Catholics have a stronger preference for the UPP to stay than people with no religion.
- . Those adhering to Umbanda or Candomble have the strongest preference for the UPP to leave.

. Relative to residents with no formal education, residents with formal education prefer the UPP to stay.

. Relative to those who earn less than one minimum wage, those who earn more have a stronger inclination for the UPP to stay.

. Those who have a friend or relative who is a police officer favor the UPP to stay, relative to those who don't.

. Relative to residents of Batan, all other favelas have stronger inclinations for the UPP to leave. It is clear that Rocinha is the favela where more people want the UPP to leave, followed by Providência and then CDD.

To conclude, the results are very similar to the ones we presented in the main text using a logit model. The reason we settled for presenting the logit model is that it is significantly easier to interpret and discuss the results.

Figure 31. Probit model: UPP should stay



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DE FAVELAS

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maqure